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Abstract: Recent studies have revealed an increase in the enrollment of students coming 
from vulnerable social sectors in private primary schools in the City of Buenos Aires. To 
date, the phenomenon of ‘private education for the poor’ has been principally studied in 
Asian and African countries, where the deficit of state educational supply has given rise to 
a multiplicity of private education undertakings of diverse nature. Using official statistical 
data, this article explores and describes the structure of private education supply in area s 
of low socioeconomic status in Buenos Aires and assesses the extent to which the category 
of low-fee private school (LFPS) contributes to understanding this phenomenon. Our 
analysis reveals a great heterogeneity in this sector of private education in Buenos Aires 
with regard to financing structures, monthly fees, and the legal forms in which schools 
operate. We also find the presence of a significant religious component. We suggest the 
possibility that private provision has helped to mitigate coverage imbalances at a 'micro-
local' level in some of the studied areas. Our comparative approach evidences that the 
notion of LFPS provides a more normative than descriptive view, limiting the perception 
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of a phenomenon that is actually much broader, multifaceted and dynamic.   
Keywords: low-fee private schools; private education; education funding; Argentina 
 
La educación privada en zonas desfavorecidas de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires y la 
‘educación privada de bajo coste’: Comparaciones, contextos e implicancias 
Resumen: Estudios recientes han evidenciado un crecimiento de la matriculación de 
alumnos provenientes de sectores sociales vulnerables en escuelas primarias privadas de la 
Ciudad de Buenos Aires. El fenómeno de la ‘educación privada para pobres’ ha sido 
estudiado especialmente en los países de Asia y África donde el evidente déficit de oferta 
educativa estatal ha dado lugar al surgimiento de una multiplicidad de experiencias 
educacionales privadas de variada naturaleza. A partir de información estadística oficial, 
este artículo propone una exploración del modo en que se estructura la oferta privada en 
las zonas de bajo nivel socioeconómico de Buenos Aires y evalúa en qué medida la 
categoría de low-fee private school  (LFPS) resulta útil para entender el fenómeno. Advertimos 
en primer lugar la gran heterogeneidad que presenta este subsector de la educación privada 
en Buenos Aires en cuanto a sus estructuras de financiamiento, el valor de los aranceles 
mensuales y las formas jurídicas bajo las que opera. Destacamos además la presencia de un 
importante componente religioso y sugerimos la posibilidad de que la oferta privada ha 
contribuido a mitigar desequilibrios de cobertura a nivel ‘microlocal’ en los ámbitos 
estudiados. Finalmente, consideramos que un enfoque comparado permite evidenciar que 
la categoría de LFPS opera un recorte más normativo que descriptivo que obtura la 
percepción de un fenómeno que es en realidad mucho más amplio, multifacético y 
dinámico. 
Palabras-clave: escuelas privadas de bajo coste; educación privada; financiamiento 
educativo; Argentina 
 
Ensino particular em areas desfavorecidas da Cidade de Buenos Aires e o ‘ensino 
particular de baixo custo’: Comparações, contextos e implicações 
Resumo: Estudos recentes têm mostrado um crescimento no número de estudantes 
provenientes de grupos sociais vulneráveis nas escolas primárias particulares da Cidade de 
Buenos Aires. O fenômeno da 'educação privada para os pobres’ foi especialmente 
estudado nos países da Ásia e da África, onde o déficit da oferta aparente no ensino 
público levou ao surgimento de uma multiplicidade de experiências educacionais privadas 
de vários tipos. A partir de estatísticas oficiais, este artigo propõe uma exploração da 
prestação do setor privado em áreas de baixo nível socioeconômico de Buenos Aires e 
avalia até que ponto a categoria de low-fee private school (LFPS) é útil para compreender 
o fenômeno. Primeiro, notamos a grande heterogeneidade que apresenta este subsector do 
ensino privado em Buenos Aires nas suas estruturas de financiamento, no valor das 
mensalidades e nas suas formas legais de agir. Ressalta-se também a presença de um 
importante componente religioso e sugerem-se a possibilidade de que a oferta privada tem 
contribuido a mitigar desequilibros mico-locales na cobertura das áreas estudadas. 
Finalmente, consideramos que uma abordagem comparativa torna evidente que a categoria 
de LFPS opera um corte mais normativo que descritivo que fechou a percepção de um 
fenômeno que é, na verdade, muito mais ampla, multifacetada e dinâmica. 
Palavras-chave: escolas privadas de baixo custo; ensino particular; financiamento da 
educação; Argentina 
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Introduction1 
Recently, private elementary schools have become an option for many low-income families 
in the City of Buenos Aires who traditionally used to send their children to state-run schools 
(Gamallo, 2011; Krüger, 2014). From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s the presence of such families 
in the private sector was marginal and only middle and high-income families opted out of public 
schools (Gómez Schettini, 2007). Nevertheless this reality has undergone change. In 2012, for 
instance, nearly a third (28.7%) of children in the poorest income quintile were attending religious 
and non-religious private elementary schools. This article provides a description of the main features 
of this expanding sub-sector of private education in Buenos Aires. In addition, we raise the question 
of whether these schools may be considered part of the so-called 'low-fee private schools' (LFPSs) 
phenomenon that has been growing in many low and middle-income countries as a response to the 
absence or perceived inadequacy of public education (Akaguri, 2014; Balarin, 2015; Dixon, 2012; 
Härmä, 2011, 2013; Phillipson, 2008; Srivastava, 2007, 2013; Verger, forthcoming, among others). 
To gain insight into the LFPS phenomenon a provocative article by Walford (2011) put to 
the test a comparison between Christian private schools in the UK and LFPSs emerging in Asia and 
Africa. Interestingly, Walford notes that despite the contextual differences, British Christian schools 
show many similarities with respect to LFPSs operating elsewhere. This comparative approach is 
invaluable in a variety of scenarios. It can help to understand the structural interdependence between 
the public and private sectors, and how working-class families behave facing the public-private 
alternative in very different contexts.  
In this vein, we argue that a comparative benchmarking exercise is relevant to analyze the 
private schools in the City of Buenos Aires that serve disadvantaged families. The existence and 
heterogeneity of these schools have remained largely unexplored. Naturally, there are differences 
between these schools in Buenos Aires and LFPSs elsewhere as we will see. However, there are 
important structural similarities that need to be considered, namely, the students’ sociological status, 
the private nature of schools, their role in contexts where public education is unavailable or 
considered inadequate, and implications regarding social justice.  
Furthermore, Buenos Aires has the highest private enrollment share in Argentina and one of 
the highest in Latin America with more than 50% of children attending private schools. The 
expansion and heterogeneity of the private sector has been driven by ‘historic public-private 
partnerships’ in the form of state subsidies to private schools since the 1940s (Verger, Zancajo, & 
Fontdevila, Forthcoming; Narodowski & Moschetti, 2015). These subsidies have enabled a special 
type of private school to emerge that establishes substantially lower fees than ‘traditional’ private 
schools. Such fees are affordable for low-income families –even when in relative terms they do 
represent a substantial part of the household income.  Interestingly, LFPSs elsewhere are 
increasingly being integrated in public-private partnership schemes as part of what Srivastava (2015) 
calls ‘the global scaling-up of low-fee private schooling’. These features make the case of the city of 
Buenos Aires particularly relevant to understand how these initiatives could evolve.  
Finally, besides exploring the main features of this sub-sector in Buenos Aires and analyzing 
its role in a broader educational structure, another aim of this article is to provide insights into the 
usefulness of the notion of LFPS as a theoretical category.  
The article is organized as follows. In section two we provide background to the LFPS 
model, thus setting the framework to analyze the Buenos Aires case. We focus on the three main 
areas of discussion: LFPS definition and implications in understanding broader privatization 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Dr. Antoni Verger, Dr. Jordi Pàmies, Dr. Mariano Narodowski, Alba 
Castejón Company, and the anonymous referees for their invaluable support and suggestions.   
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processes, the regulatory environments in which LFPSs operate, and quality and equity related 
concerns.  
In section three we present an overview of the privatization process undertaken by the 
Argentine education system in its recent history. We then discuss the general characteristics of both 
the private education sector of the City of Buenos Aires and the subsidy allocation system emerging 
from a historic public-private partnership. In section four, drawing on official statistical databases, 
we build and analyze a series of indicators intended to map out first the distribution of enrollments 
across communes2  and by income quintile, and then to characterize private schools in the city’s 
communes 4, 7, 8 and 9, which gather most of the highly vulnerable population in the city. Finally, a 
brief concluding section summarizes the central ideas of the article.  
Low-Fee Private Schools: Main Areas of Discussion 
What are LFPSs and Where Do They Stand in Privatization Processes  
The LFPS model is not confined to a single definition as its great proliferation has led to 
numerous ventures, adapted to the characteristics of each area. One of the biggest problems in 
defining LFPS is determining what ‘low-fee’ means. In this respect, Verger (Forthcoming) 
emphasizes that this concept is contingent on not only ‘the social structure of the countries where 
these schools operate, but also on the economic circumstances of particular families’. Srivastava 
(2008, p.453) tries to set a threshold and points out that in order to qualify as low-fee, schools must 
not charge a monthly fee exceeding the amount corresponding to the daily income of a non-
qualified worker, for primary level, and no more than twice that amount for secondary level. 
However, these precise statements are problematic when considering cases where some LFPSs are 
partly subsidized by the state, as occurs in Nigeria or South Africa (Härmä, 2013; Schirmer et al, 
2010; Ahmed & Sayed, 2009). 
In a study on LFPSs in Asia and Africa, Phillipson (2008) defined them as ‘schools created 
by an individual or group of individuals aiming at financial profit’ (p.1), and excludes any school 
operated by nonprofit organizations, religious organizations, community organizations, and of 
course, traditional private schools. This definition has some problems that have been identified by 
Walford (2011). In fact, Phillipson’s definition is an extreme simplification of the reasons why 
private schools are created to serve the low-income population. Walford argues that with the 
exclusion of low-fee schools run by NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) and religious 
organizations, we lose sight of much of this new trend of privatization that differs from traditional 
privatization modes, and he contends that the very idea of profit is relative: 
[the definition] restricts our understanding of why such schools might be started 
and how the schools themselves, and the motivations for their continued 
existence, may change in nature over a period of time. For example, even the idea 
that they must ‘make a profit’ collapses within the complexity of individuals and 
groups paying themselves salaries, or establishing schools so that they might gain 
employment. What is clear is that the vast majority of these new private schools 
are not the result of shareholders investing money in schools because they see 
that as the way to obtain the highest financial return. The reasons for starting and 
continuing with the schools are much more complex, and there is thus the need 
                                                 
2 The city is divided in 48 neighborhoods grouped into 15 administrative communes. Communes are not 
responsible for arranging education provision. 
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to consider the whole range of non-government-sector schools with low fees that 
are designed to serve some of the poorest families in each society. (2011, p. 403)  
 
Underlying the problem of defining LFPS is a debate about what type of privatization thei r 
appearance and development imply. Returning to the limited definition offered by Phillipson 
(2008), we find an explanation for LFPSs that hails market mechanisms as a solution to the 
problems of state supply deficit. Along these lines, Tooley (2013, pp. 447-448) considers it is a 
process of ‘grassroots privatization’, thus adding to the equation a component of supposed 
spontaneous community organization. He views this as inherent to the LFPS model, following a 
‘bottom-up’ type of logic regardless of the state. However, as Verger (Forthcoming) notes, these 
postulates become contradictory when they are immediately followed by recommendations in 
favor of governments and international organizations to help with funds and encourage this type 
of school provision. Do these schools then lose their LFPS status as soon as they begin to 
receive public funding and somehow become part of state educational policy?  
In short, the LFPS model is a way of privatization that, Verger notes (Forthcoming), began 
as a phenomenon resulting from the state's failure regarding school coverage and/or quality; namely 
a kind of default privatization. But today it takes more complex forms, due to the involvement of 
international organizations and states themselves in the shaping of public-private partnerships 
(PPPs). Indeed the LFPS model is increasingly being proposed as a valid education policy 
alternative. Its financial model may follow traditional patterns of partial public funding to private 
schools, considered as an emerging level PPP (Verger, 2012). Alternatively, as put forth by some 
researchers (Dixon, 2012; Tooley & Dixon, 2003), it could involve directing funds from 
international organizations to finance these schools, or establishing education voucher systems to 
increase opportunities for school choice. In this respect, the debate over the definition of the LFPS 
model is far from conclusive. As noted by Junemann and Ball (2015), determining what is LFPS 
demands studies that reveal the specifics of each private form of school provision aimed at the most 
vulnerable social sectors. 
Problems of Acknowledgement and Legal Status 
Most researchers consider LFPS as a phenomenon that arose in the shadow of deficient 
state education systems. In the documentation about LFPSs, there are schools created for profit by 
their founders, and many others resulting from more altruistic motives (Walford, 2011). 
Nevertheless, they share their origin as a response to the absence or to the perceived inadequacy of 
the state provision. Accordingly, Härmä (2009; 2013) highlights that those families who choose 
these schools never base their decision on an ideological overestimation of the private mode. On the 
contrary, the decision and choice process in favor of private supply is eminently pragmatic and is 
analogous to what happens when the state fails to adequately provide other public supplies and 
services, either in quantity or in perceived quality. 
As regards the increasing number of LFPSs, the reaction of states seems to drive 
schematically to two poles. On the one hand, in most cases, the trend is to grant no official 
acknowledgement to these schools and as a result, their activities become simply illegal. However, in 
other cases, some of these schools actually get official acknowledgement either because they meet 
the corresponding legal requirements, or by virtue of what Srivastava (2008, p.468) calls ‘shadow 
institutional framework’, in the case of India. In this case, the authorities grant acknowledgement to 
LFPSs, even though they do not meet the current regulatory framework. In Srivastava’s point of 
view, this acknowledgement occurs as a result of pressure from two sources: first, awareness on the 
part of the authorities regarding the official regulatory framework containing a number of perverse 
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incentives that force private schools to meet requirements that public schools never achieve. 
Second, awareness that LFPSs unquestionably contribute to increase school enrollment rates where 
the state cannot expand the coverage. This is where the juxtaposition of the goals of Education For 
All and the budgetary restrictions of developing countries lead states themselves and international 
organizations like the World Bank to begin perceiving LFPSs as valid ways to extend coverage (see 
Verger and Bonal [2012]). 
Quality and Equity 
Even when LFPSs actually increase coverage in countries where the state fails to expand free 
schooling, questions inevitably emerge regarding quality and equity. The evidence concerning the 
quality of these schools is not conclusive at all (Junemann & Ball, 2015; Day Ashley et al., 2014). 
Several studies claim that the performance of students, the infrastructure and the teaching staff of 
LFPSs are superior if compared to the available state supply (Dixon, 2012; Garg, 2011; Tooley, 
2013; Tooley & Dixon, 2003, 2006). However, these findings are relative and limited: state supply 
shows a heterogeneity that is not considered in these studies and that is by no means negligible. 
Moreover, the quality indicators used are not rigorous enough, the scale of these results does not 
support generalization, and relevant contextual elements are ignored in the analysis. Sarangapani and 
Winch (2010) present one of the strongest objections:  
Yet in the current study, Tooley et al. have chosen a new set of very unusual 
metrics as proxies for ‘quality’ of educational opportunities. The authors are 
correct in claiming that basic health and hygiene, safety and comfort and the 
presence of teacher activity are all important. But the extensive data gathered, 
tabulated and analysed, of various infrastructural aspects, including the presence 
of fans, tape recorders and televisions, on which they conclude that the PUU are 
better or at least as good as government schools, borders on the absurd, 
particularly when taken with other possible indicators which are omitted. Indeed, 
they choose these relatively trivial indicators over other proxies such as teacher 
training qualifications or time-tabled activities! (2010, p. 511) 
 
Some researchers also question the ‘inclusive’ nature of LFPSs, observing that no matter what 
the cost is, it is still unaffordable for the poorest families (Akaguri, 2014; De, Noronha, & 
Samson, 2002; Fennell & Malik, 2012; Härmä, 2011; 2009). This reality raises a debate about the 
equitable nature of LFPS development. Additionally, the supposed cost-efficient nature of low-
cost undertakings often goes hand in hand with low quality in teaching, perhaps the most 
important component of a quality educational experience (Härmä, 2011, p. 563). Regarding 
equity issues and these schools possibly substituting a free but inadequate state supply, Tooley 
(2013) makes a theoretical effort to redefine the concept of transcendental Rawlsian justice by 
resorting to Amartya Sen’s notion of ‘relative’ or ‘possible’ justice. He  arrives at the conclusion 
that LFPSs are not necessarily unfair, or at least not more unfair than the status quo. Tooley’s 
stance is interesting because it tries to dismiss the value of a supposed ‘egalitarian utopia’ and 
paves the way towards a typically market pragmatism. However, even if we exclude from the 
analysis those families that cannot afford even a low-cost school –that in Tooley’s scheme, could 
benefit from some voucher-like or affirmative action program– and we consider only equity 
issues concerning low-income families that can actually afford to pay for these schools, the 
questions raised by Härmä persist:  
Diverting poor families’ spending in this way from other areas of essential 
expenditure may prevent or delay their movement out of poverty, and may 
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prevent much needed investments in small businesses and other livelihood 
opportunities. Allowing this situation to continue is manifestly against the 
interest of working towards a more equal and just society. (2013, p. 550) 
 
In this section we have briefly discussed the main areas of academic and policy concern 
regarding the LFPS phenomenon. In order to undertake a comparative benchmarking exercise 
we have focused on three main topics that provide a framework for analyzing private schools 
that serve disadvantaged families in Buenos Aires. We have also raised some questions and 
noted some issues still under debate concerning the nature and workings of LFPS that need to 
be kept in mind for any analysis of this sector. We will draw on this in the discussion section of 
the paper. 
The Privatization of Education in Argentina:  
New (and not so New) Trends 
Partial Privatization of Education Supply 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the Argentine education system underwent 
a transformation defined by sustained growth of student enrollment in private schools. This process, 
which started in the 1960s, broke with the existing arrangement of education provision. Prior to that 
moment, education in Argentina was eminently state-run, via a process of ‘statalization’ of the pre-
existing supply as occurred in many countries between the XIX and XX centuries (Narodowski, 
2011; Perazza, 2011). Demand-side pressures, deregulation policies and changes in the financing 
structure of the system initially powered the transformation in the 1960s within a logic framework 
that some consider as quasi-spontaneous (Morduchowicz et al., 1999) or by default (Narodowski, 
2008). The present Argentine education system reflects a ‘quasi-state monopoly’ structure resulting 
from a dynamic balance between the traditional state sector and a private sector of great 
heterogeneity, partially financed by public funds (Narodowski, 2011). Within the context of chronic 
fiscal shortages, habitually emerging in developing countries, the private sector is a cost-efficient 
alternative that can enable maximization of school coverage. Families that can finance their exit to 
the private sector ‘release’ state funds and vacancies in public schools. In turn, the associated cost of 
a scheme with these characteristics has been the increasing, well-documented socioeconomic 
homogenization within each subsector (Gasparini, Jaume, Serio, & Vazquez, 2011; Narodowski, 
Moschetti, & Gottau, 2013). 
In terms of the dynamics between public and private provision, enrollment in private 
schools seemed to held steady  at approximately  24%3 in the mid 1990s (Narodowski & Moschetti, 
2015). However, despite the profound economic crisis that the country underwent during 2001-
20024, and the post-crisis government’s discourse in favor of public education, since 2003 the private 
education sector's growth resumed and reached 28.9% in 2013 (DiNIECE, 2014)5. This 
                                                 
3 The percentage corresponds to the Compulsory Education System, which covers the Initial, Primary, 
Secondary and High Non-University levels. 
4 In December 2001, an unprecedented economic crisis began in Argentina that led to a political crisis, to the 
sovereign debt payment being interrupted, and to the withdrawal from the convertibility and parity regime 
between Argentine currency and the US dollar. See Cortés Conde (2003). 
5 Compulsory Education. Latest data available (National Administration of Information and Evaluation of 
Educational Quality – National Ministry of Education). 
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transformation may be related to the economic recovery of the middle classes throughout the 
period. However, this sole explanation cannot account for the phenomenon in all its magnitude. 
The Argentine education system is federally organized and each of the 23 provinces as well 
as the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires is responsible for the provision, regulation and financing 
of their systems. The group including the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santa Fe, and the 
Autonomous City of Buenos Aires account for 59% of total enrollment in compulsory education. In 
the Latin American educational context, Argentina ranks second in privatization, only outranked by 
Chile whose education system is, unlike the Argentine, structured on the basis of demand-side 
financing and a quasi-market model (Narodowski & Nores, 2002; UNESCO, 2014). If we consider 
variations by province for the period 2002-2013, the growth trend is consistent throughout all 
Argentine provinces, though major urban centers and the most populous provinces show more 
private participation (Moschetti, 2013). .                            
In the City of Buenos Aires, while 47.8% of students attended a private school in 2002, 
50.7% did in 2013, and so private school has become the main mode of provision in the district for 
levels included in compulsory education (DiNIECE, 2014). Studying the case of the City of Buenos 
Aires is interesting due to the unprecedently high participation of the private sector in the provision 
of education. Moreover, recent changes in the characteristics of the population served by these 
private schools add to the relevance of this case. According to data from the 2012 Annual 
Household Survey of the City of Buenos Aires for primary education, 28.7% of children in the 
poorest quintile attended religious and non-religious private schools. For the second poorest 
quintile, the percentage rises to 46%. Additionally, the survey reveals that 13.7% of primary school 
children living in villas miseria6 or very poor households attend privately-run schools (Narodowski, 
Rozada, Moschetti, & Gottau, 2015). These data are very striking in a context like Argentina where 
the public school system had in the 1950s around 93% of total enrollments. Argentina had at the 
time the highest rates of school attendance in the region: by 1955, 79.9% of the population aged 14 
to 17 had completed primary school and the primary school net enrollment rate in 1960 was 85.6% 
(Morduchowicz et al., 1999; Rivas, Vera, & Bezem, 2010; SITEAL, 2014). 
Partial Public Funding 
The process of private school enrollment growth was accompanied in all provinces by an 
increase in state funding aimed at partially financing teachers’ salaries in most private schools7 
(Moschetti, 2013). These subsidies respond to a dispositif of state support to the private sector that 
has existed in Argentina since the 1940s. Its logic respects in practice the idea of ‘public funding and 
private supply’, considered the guiding principle of every public-private partnership (Verger & 
Bonal, 2012). Given its longstanding existence, some have called this kind of scheme ‘historic 
public-private partnerships’ (Verger, Zancajo & Fontdevila, forthcoming).  
                                                 
6 Villas miseria are urban agglomerations of informal, densely populated settlements composed of extremely 
substandard housing. In the City of Buenos Aires, there are 20 villas miseria, mainly gathered in communes 
No. 4, 7, 8, and 9. See Kessler and Di Virgilio (2008), and Clichevsky (2003). 
7 According to a study by Mezzadra and Rivas (2010), 65% of private institutions of the country benefit from 
Sstate funding to some extent. In the case of the Province of Buenos Aires, there is some progressivity 
between the proportion of granted subsidies and the income level of the served populations. However, the 
study also evidences significant inconsistencies: ‘17% of schools within the poorest tercile receive less than 
50% of State subsidy. In turn, 16% of schools within the highest tercile receive more than 75% of State 
contributions’ (Mezzadra and Rivas, 2010, p. 58). Except for this study regarding the Province of Buenos 
Aires, there are no data on how subsidies are distributed in each province. 
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Since the 1960s, in addition to state funding, the expansion of the private sector was driven 
by a process of deregulation with respect to the bureaucratic hierarchies of the state sector. Along 
this process, spontaneous changes in preferences by those demanding education were made easier or 
induced by new regulation arrangements (Morduchowicz, 2005, p. 39). These new regulations and 
deregulations formed a legal framework that would guarantee the activities of private institutions, 
thus ensuring the stability and acknowledgement of teachers in the sector, the validity of certificates 
issued by non-state institutions, in addition to regular allocation of public funds in order to afford 
teacher salary expenses in some proportion (Morduchowicz, 1999). There is no evidence to 
exclusively attribute the growth of the sector to the systematic granting of funds. Nevertheless this 
practice has provided incentive and validation. 
The system of state funding to private education originated in 1947 under the first 
presidency of Juan D. Perón (Law 13,047). The purpose was twofold: to ensure school provision in 
areas where there were no public schools, and to supply financial aid to private schools—mostly 
catholic schools—serving low-income households. That event marked the beginning of the 
systematization of a policy that subsequently, and through successive decrees (Nº 15 of 1964, and 
Nº 2,542 of 1991), gained a clearer definition regarding the proportion of teacher salary expense that 
the state would finance (currently from 40 to 100%). The basis used to calculate the amount for 
each school has always been teacher salary expense, considering only those who teach contents 
included in the official curriculum. The norm also establishes certain criteria to define grants and 
their proportion (socioeconomic status of the pupils’ families, proximity and availability of similar 
state schooling, etc.). But these are not comprehensive, and the decision rests, as some studies note, 
on good judgment and at the discretion of the relevant authorities (Mezzadra and Rivas, 2010; 
Morduchowicz 1999). Public funds thereby do not compensate for real estate investment, 
extracurricular teacher salaries or other related expenses. 
Private Subsidized Primary Schools in the City of Buenos Aires within 
Contexts of Low Socioeconomic Status 
Distribution of Enrollment and General Indicators 
The education system of the City of Buenos Aires is heterogeneous, including a private 
sector of great quantitative relevance and of great variety. Historically, it has been private schools 
that have provided religious education, mainly Catholic, but also Protestant, Jewish and Islamic. In 
addition, there are several schools that reflect the immigration history of the country (Italian, 
Spanish, British and Armenian schools, among others). Further, there are others that stand out by 
offering certain pedagogical orientations that are not feasible within the frame of hyper regulation 
the state provision is subject to (for instance, Waldorf, Piagetian, Art Education, etc.) (Narodowski, 
1998). The picture gets even more complex if we take into account that many of these schools 
receive some kind of state funding. 
Traditionally, as in other Latin American metropolitan areas, private schools in Buenos Aires 
were considered to serve exclusively middle and high-income households and it was the middle class 
that benefited the most from subsidized lower monthly fees (Pereyra, 2008). However, a detailed 
current view into the system adds new elements of analysis and introduces some nuances into this 
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scenario. Table 1 presents the distribution of primary school enrollment among public schools, 
private schools, and private religious schools8 in 2012, for each of the 15 communes of the city. 
 
Table 1 
Percentage of Students in Primary Schools by Commune and Type of School. City of Buenos Aires - Year 2012 
Commune SES Public Private Private 
Religious 
Private Non-
Religious 
4 Low 74.5 25.5 21.6 3.9 
7 Low 61.8 38.2 23.4 14.9 
8 Low 73.4 26.6 14.2 12.4 
9 Low 57.3 42.7 36.8 5.9 
1 Middle 66.3 33.7 20.8 12.9 
3 Middle 56.6 43.4 31.1 12.3 
5 Middle 44.3 55.7 31.3 24.4 
10 Middle 65.1 34.9 22.1 12.8 
15 Middle 58.3 41.7 28.8 12.9 
2 High 44.5 55.5 43.0 12.5 
6 High 41.1 58.9 31.7 27.2 
11 High 48.5 51.5 34.6 16.8 
12 High 48.1 51.9 28.9 23.0 
13 High 24.6 75.4 47.9 27.5 
14 High 16.8 83.2 51.5 31.7 
Total 
 
54.5 45.5 29.6 15.9 
Note: Annual Household Survey of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and Narodowski, Rozada, 
Moschetti, & Gottau (2015). 
Total enrollment in private schools accounts for 45.5% because this survey only records students living in the 
City. However, if we consider students who live in the Province of Buenos Aires (contiguous), but attending 
educational institutions in the City, the percentage rises to 47.9% (National Administration of Information 
and Assessment of Educational Quality - DiNIECE). 
                                                 
8 There is no available information regarding students’ enrollment in subsidized and non-subsidized private 
schools. 
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Even in those communes that concentrate most of the low-SES households, the students’ 
enrollment rate in private schools ranks from 25 to 43%. Most of the city’s population living in villas 
miseria and other precarious settlements is located in these communes (4, 7, 8 and 9). In these places, 
family income per capita is lower than the city’s average by more than 10%, and socio-educational 
indicators are the most critical of the district (DGECE, 2014). If in addition we take a look at the 
distribution of the enrollment by income quintile, the participation of the private sector within the 
two lowest quintiles is considerable (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
Percentage of Students in Primary Schools by Income Quintile and Type of School. City of Buenos Aires - Year 2012 
Quintile Public Private Private Religious Private Non-
Religious 
1 (Richest) 25.1 74.9 46.4 28.5 
2 15.2 84.8 47.7 37.1 
3 36.0 64.0 40.5 23.6 
4 53.8 46.2 32.0 14.2 
5 (Poorest) 71.6 28.4 19.7 8.7 
Total 54.5 45.5 29.6 15.9 
Note: Annual Household Survey of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, and Narodowski, Rozada, 
Moschetti, & Gottau (2015). 
 
Even though we note that throughout the whole City religious private education has a 
stronger presence than non-religious private education, in low-SES communes the gap in favor of 
religious education widens. A priori, we could consider that this pattern is related to the fact that 
religious schools are often the main recipients of state subsidies and therefore, the ones charging the 
lowest fees. However, such a generalization is not entirely correct: It should be noted that, on the 
one hand, in commune 8 (low-SES), private enrollment is divided almost equally between religious 
and non-religious schools; on the other hand, in communes 13 and 14 (high-SES), private religious 
schools account for a very high share. These elements indicate the ubiquitous and heterogeneous 
nature of private religious education in the City. There are religious schools at all levels of the ‘local 
hierarchies’. Some offer education at prices only accessible for the most well-off, while others charge 
subsidized (or highly subsidized) monthly fees that benefit the middle and low-income sectors. 
Supply Structure in Communes 4, 7, 8 and 9 
We now characterize how supply is structured in these contexts in terms of public and 
private provision, identifying how many private institutions benefit from state financial support and 
to what extent. It is also of interest to know whether education run by religious and non-profit 
organizations is as prevalent as is thought. What is ultimately the role of private schooling in these 
areas? Does it contribute to mitigate a problem of public education shortage? 
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 If we look at the structure of supply by commune, in particular as regards the situation in 
communes 4, 7, 8 and 9 (Table 3), we notice a number of issues that deserve some further 
consideration. First, low-SES communes show the highest number of students and sections9 in 
the City. In the case of communes 4 and 8, the number of enrolled students is virtually twice the  
 
Table 3  
Schools, Sections, Enrollment and Indicators per Commune. Primary Level. City of Buenos Aires - Year 2011 
Commune 
Schools   Sections   Enrollment   
Sections per 
School 
  
Students per 
Section 
Public Private   Public Private   Public Private   Public Private   Public Private 
1 27 25 
 
432 291 
 
9,086 7,763 
 
16 12 
 
21.0 26.7 
2 10 24 
 
150 260 
 
3,260 6,165 
 
15 11 
 
21.7 23.7 
3 28 26 
 
438 351 
 
9,131 8,384 
 
16 14 
 
20.8 23.9 
4 53 26   793 273   18,800 7,600   15 11   23.7 27.8 
5 19 22 
 
309 259 
 
6,129 7,351 
 
16 12 
 
19.8 28.4 
6 20 25 
 
305 323 
 
6,399 8,736 
 
15 13 
 
21.0 27.0 
7 34 32   489 365   10,981 8,947   14 11   22.5 24.5 
8 32 16   710 242   18,159 7,670   22 15   25.6 31.7 
9 40 23   545 334   11,769 9,695   14 15   21.6 29.0 
10 37 23 
 
522 262 
 
10,535 7,234 
 
14 11 
 
20.2 27.6 
11 40 30 
 
534 367 
 
10,214 9,526 
 
13 12 
 
19.1 26.0 
12 37 35 
 
486 363 
 
8,833 9,147 
 
13 10 
 
18.2 25.2 
13 23 54 
 
323 662 
 
5,738 15,864 
 
14 12 
 
17.8 24.0 
14 22 39 
 
358 458 
 
6,667 10,815 
 
16 12 
 
18.6 23.6 
15 33 25 
 
397 248 
 
7,119 5,699 
 
12 10 
 
17.9 23.0 
Total 455 425   6,791 5,058   142,820 130,596   15 12   21.0 25.8 
Note: General Bureau of Evaluation of Educational Quality—Ministry of Education of the City of 
Buenos Aires 
                                                 
9 A section is a group of students by grade and school. This is an acceptably homogeneous unit of measure, 
unlike, for example, an education unit or school, which can vary considerably in size. 
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number of students of in other communes. Second, public schools have a greater number of  
sections per school than private schools. Third, on average, the number of students per section 
in both public and private schools is slightly higher in ‘poor’ communes. Finally, the number of 
students per section in private schools is consistently higher than the number of students per 
section in public schools in all communes. 
Even though the poorest areas of the city gather a larger number of students due to their 
own socio-demographic dynamics10, the data presented show no evidence, in principle, of 
overcrowding in public school classrooms. From the aggregate perspective that these indicators 
make possible, the system appears to be balanced, and the expansion of private schooling has 
certainly played a role in achieving full school attendance rates. Nevertheless, overcrowded school 
scenarios have in fact been observed in many public schools in low-SES communes (Martinez, 
2012). Here, the commune as a territorial unit includes urban heterogeneities that tend to average out 
and mask the dynamics that occur mainly at a ‘micro-local’ level. These dynamics are of greater 
complexity in communes 4, 7, 8 and 9 where there has been overwhelming growth of villas miseria 
and informal settlements. This expansion followed a very different timing and growth pattern with 
respect to predictions regarding urban planning. Between 2001 and 2012, the population living in 
these settlements in the City increased by 81%, from 107,422 to 194,228 (Mazzeo, 2013). 
Consequently, the very location of schools is a problem and the system will not always be able to 
respond ‘in balance’ to a demand that reveals itself as constantly changing. Balance in general terms 
does not imply in any way the absence of imbalances that may be found at a more local scale than 
the commune (i.e., neighborhoods). Full school attendance rates reveal, therefore, that private 
provision has contributed to the overall balance, but also suggest that it has helped to mitigate 
coverage imbalances unevenly across neighborhoods that would deserve in-depth study. 
A second point to note is that in all cases private schools have substantially more students 
per classroom than public schools and that this trend occurs more noticeably in poor communes. At 
the same time, public schools tend to have more sections per school, either because school buildings 
have on average higher capacity, or because the half-day school mode –of greater relative 
importance in public schools than in private schools (see Tuñón and Halperin [2010])– enables the 
possibility of opening a section in the morning and another one in the afternoon, which would 
count for one section at a full-day school. 
Related to the above, our data is the consequence of two different strategies of ‘efficient’ use 
of resources, both with significant implications in terms of quality. First, maximizing the number of 
students per section in an attempt to maximize the use of classrooms; and second, by means of half-
day school modalities, increase the number of sections so as to maximize the use of the school 
building. Commune 8 is the most extreme example of these dynamics, with 22 sections per public 
school and 31.7 students per section in private schools. These initiatives, which acquire particular 
characteristics depending on the possibilities of each context, make full coverage in primary 
education feasible, but at the same time cause strong imbalances and inequalities between schools. 
With 31.7 students per section, private schools in commune 8 can hardly provide quality education 
in the same fashion as private schools in middle or high-SES communes where the average is 23 
students per section11. 
                                                 
10 Communes 4, 7, 8 and 9 show the highest rates of global fertility (2006-2010) and account for 35% of 
births in the City (DGECE, 2014). 
11 Unfortunately, in Argentina there are no standardized evaluation systems of educational quality that would 
at least shed some light on this matter. The National Assessment Operation (ONE) is held every three years 
and its results do not admit year-to-year comparison. Besides, results are not usually available until two years 
after the evaluation and the National Education Law does not allow data dissemination. 
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Looking at the structure of the private sector in communes 4, 7, 8 and 9, the heterogeneity 
of legal forms adopted by schools is striking (Figure 1). Here again we find a complex pattern of 
interdependencies between public and private –in its various forms– that according to Walford 
(2011) makes a restrictive definition of LFPS an oversimplification of limited use. Moreover, there 
are no legal restrictions in most Argentine provinces for educational institutions to be for profit. In 
the City of Buenos Aires, both for-profit and non-profit schools are entitled to apply for state 
subsidies ranging from 40 to 80% of teacher salary expense. This certainly contributes to the 
heterogeneity of legal forms we find across the city’s communes. Only those institutions that charge 
no monthly fees are entitled to apply for a subsidy representing 100% of teacher salary expense, and 
only in these cases profit is not allowed (Decree Nº 2,542/91). 
 
 
Figure 1. Private Schools in Communes 4, 7, 8 and 9 according to Type of Entity (Legal Form) - Year 
2014 
Note: Own preparation based on data from the General Department of Private Education of the 
Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (DGEGP) 
 
Regarding the financing structure of these institutions, only 10% do not receive state 
funding. The remaining 90% receive state funding ranging from 40% to 100% of teacher salary 
expense. In most cases –78%– schools receive a contribution greater or equal to 80% (Table 4). The 
systematic use of these supply-side funding mechanisms in order to meet educational needs outside 
the domain of the state sector is clearly demonstrated here. 
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Table 4 
Percentage of Private Schools in Communes 4, 7, 8 and 9 according to Received State Funding - Year 2014 
State Funding Funding percentage scale Percentage of schools 
No 0% 9.6% 
Yes 
40% 1.1% 
50% 2.1% 
60% 4.3% 
70% 5.3% 
80% 23.4% 
100% 54.3% 
Note: Own preparation based on data from the General Department of Private Education of the 
Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (DGEGP) 
 
Considering the supply structure in these communes according to the type of religion of 
schools (Table 5), we confirm part of what we expected: Religious schools generally benefit the most 
from public financing. This is mainly due to historical reasons. The country’s ‘historic public-private 
partnership’ scheme was in part based on the need to integrate the preexisting catholic schools into 
the national education system. Unlike what happens in more traditionally secular states, in Argentina 
the fact that religious institutions receive state subsidies is a longstanding and somewhat naturalized 
phenomenon stemming from the legitimacy of the ‘teaching freedom´ principle (Verger, Zancajo & 
Fontdevila, Forthcoming; Morduchowicz, 2005). In the case of communes 4, 7, 8 and 9, there are no  
Table 5  
Percentage of Private Schools in Communes 4, 7, 8 and 9 according to State Funding Granted and Religion - Year 2014 
State Funding Confession Percentage of schools 
No Secular 10% 
Yes 
Catholic 60% 
Secular 24% 
Jewish 4% 
Evangelical Christian 2% 
Note: Own preparation based on data from the General Department of Private Education of the 
Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (DGEGP) 
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religious schools that do not receive subsidies (unlike what happens in other communes). However, 
it is important to highlight here that the legal form of schools does not automatically determine 
whether they receive subsidies or not. There are schools registered as ‘Public Limited Companies’ 
and ‘Limited Liability Companies’ that benefit from subsidies, among many others of the same legal 
form that do not. Similarly, there are ‘Non-profit Organizations’ in both groups. 
As we saw, one of the controversial points about defining the LFPS category lies in the difficulty of 
establishing a fee threshold. In this respect, we emphasized the importance of contextualization. In 
the case of low-SES communes, the average monthly fee of non-subsidized schools is AR$ 2,203 
and AR$ 71712 in subsidized schools. Figure 2 provides relevant data showing the number of schools 
(% of total) for each fee interval. There are 41 schools that charge a monthly fee of less than USD 
4013, including some with fees even lower than USD 20. These fees represent between 5% and 12% 
of the minimum wage in AR$ 4,400 (National Ministry of Economy, 2014), although it is evident 
that the comparison is valid only for formal workers. 
 
Figure 2. Histogram of Monthly Private Schools Fees in Communes 4, 7, 8 and 9 - Year 2014 
Note: Own preparation based on data from the General Department of Private Education of the 
Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (DGEGP) 
Fees expressed in USD at the ‘free’ exchange rate.  
Discussion 
This study shows the heterogeneous structure of the private education sector within the 
most vulnerable areas of Buenos Aires. This diversity is evidenced by different legal configurations, 
religions, bonds with the state system and monthly fees that each school charges, among other 
variables. The heterogeneity observed has also been reported in countries where the study of LFPSs 
originated (Härmä, 2013; Srivastava, 2008; Heyneman & Stern, 2013). In line with Junemann and 
Ball (2015), we argue that such variation in practices calls for reconsidering the categories to analyze 
                                                 
12 The Argentine exchange system is complex due to operations being conducted both at the official exchange 
rate (USD 1=AR$ 8.50) and at the ‘free’ exchange rate (USD 1=AR$ 14.58). The latter is by definition illegal, 
though it plays a decisive role in the setting of consumer prices - December 2014. 
13 Fees expressed in USD at the ‘free’ exchange rate. 
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private education in disadvantaged contexts, as well as the delimitation and implications of the 
phenomenon.  
In the case of Buenos Aires, schools have a substantial religious component, which is greater 
in disadvantaged communes than in those of middle or high socioeconomic status. This religious 
component has a certain independence from the legal forms under which these schools operate. 
There are religious schools operating as part of religious congregations, as NGOs, foundations and 
limited liability companies, among others. In turn, there are for-profit institutions, though the vast 
majority fall into schemes that only aim at covering operating costs: 54.3% of schools in communes 
4, 7, 8 and 9 receive subsidies representing 100% of teacher salary expense. According to current 
legislation, in order to obtain such an amount of subsidy, schools must not pursue profit. Among 
the schools that receive less than 100% subsidy on teacher salary expense, 32% are NGOs or 
foundations, which are by definition non-profit organizations. 
We have seen that the for-profit/nonprofit dichotomy is not always sufficient to describe 
the ways in which institutions can operate from an economic and financial perspective. However, 
the purest definition of LFPS requires that, in order to qualify as such, a school must pursue profit 
(Phillipson, 2008). We argue that this definition is more normative than descriptive. The creation 
and use of the concept of LFPS in policy rhetoric and discourse seems to stem from the 
determination to put forth a stable, standardized and replicable model of education, alternative to 
the state model, based on only some of the many forms of educational provision that spontaneously 
arise bottom-up outside the state sphere. Unsurprisingly, most studies presenting evidence in favor of 
profit-making LFPSs have been in fact produced or funded by LFPS entrepreneurs or investors (see 
for instance the controversy raised between Tooley and Longfield 2015] and Day Ashley et al.’s 
2015] DFID-Commissioned ‘Rigorous Literature Review’ on the role and impact of private schools 
in developing countries). The idea of profit as a necessary factor included in the LFPS definition 
intensifies only one dimension of the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ that may lead an individual or a group 
of individuals to create a school (Walford, 2011). It automatically leaves out a whole range of 
undertakings form the social economy sphere such as NGOs, community-run schools or even faith-
based organizations that seek to increase access for disadvantaged children (see Nishimuko 2009] 
for the case of NGOs and religious schools in Sierra Leone, and Blum 2009] for the case of NGOs 
in India). 
Therefore, we consider that the notion of ‘low-fee private school’ can over-simplify and 
even blind the view of a phenomenon that is actually much broader and multifaceted (Junemann & 
Ball, 2015). It needs to be named and considered in such a way that reflects that nature. If these 
undertakings are coined in more general terms and analyzed at a local scale, then some common 
structural elements found among different contexts are manifested. A comparison between low-fee 
private schools in Buenos Aires and low-fee private schools in Asia and Africa may appear hard to 
accept. However, as Walford (2011, p. 402) puts it regarding his own comparative study dealing with 
low-fee private Christian schools in England: “I recognize that this comparison may seem somewhat 
bizarre, however there are occasions when the results of such comparisons can challenge our 
perceptions and modify our understandings of situations in other countries.” In our case, we have 
identified a potential continuity between both contexts: Buenos Aires’ long-standing public-private 
partnership in education may reflect a possible future for countries that decide to engage in the 
integration of LFPS into public-private partnerships.  
There are various reasons why these schools have been set up in Buenos Aires, a feature 
shared by the ventures in Asia and Africa where private providers, NGOs, philanthropic 
organizations, communities and faith-based organizations shape educational systems meeting excess 
or differentiated demands (Heyneman & Stern, 2013; Rose, 2009). Thereby, personal or institutional 
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reasons include aspects related to religion, philanthropy, commerce, and community engagement. If 
we narrow these reasons to commercial matters, we would be losing sight of a whole range of 
solutions that communities build to face the need for education. We would also overlook the 
diversity of methods that states can promote to govern the system. In general, the development of 
these schools was or is associated with some kind of state supply deficit, and thus these processes 
have been characterized as occurring by default. In cases like India or Nigeria, this is evident because 
we observe these processes in real time as governments explore different alternatives to reach the 
Education For All targets. In Buenos Aires, with full school attendance rates, we arrive at the same 
conclusion visualizing a counterfactual scenario where the private sector did not exist and 50% of 
school enrollment would become ‘excess demand’ straightaway. This counterfactual scenario 
becomes even more challenging in vulnerable areas of the city, where private schools hold high 
enrollment rates and public schools gather in absolute terms twice the number of students when 
compared to other communes. 
Considering this somewhat arbitrary comparison between both contexts, we can see that 
while in India or Nigeria a great number of these schools are not officially acknowledged, or operate 
under an irregular system as described by Srivastava (2008), in the case of Buenos Aires, all of them 
are included within the official system and are thus subject to government regulation. However, it is 
interesting to note that this acknowledgement was the result of a long process and, in fact, private 
schools were authorized to grant official academic certificates only from 1969 onwards (Perazza, 
2011). The official acknowledgement and the subsidy allocation system were the response of the 
Argentine state to the challenge regarding the development and administration of a national 
education system. This public-private partnership solution was chosen then among other possible 
schemes.  
In contrast, national education systems are currently under construction in most countries in 
Asia and Africa where the LFPS phenomenon has been studied. Primary school net attendance 
ratios barely reach 65% in West and Central Africa and 80% in South Asia (UNICEF, 2014). In an 
attempt to achieve the articulation of those educational systems and ensure universal coverage in 
primary education there are numerous initiatives that promote the integration of LFPSs in public-
private partnership frameworks of varied and complex nature that need thorough analysis 
(Akyeampong, 2009; Srivastava, 2010). The long-standing Argentine PPP framework may yield some 
lessons. It is quite clear that these diverse private undertakings originate in response to the nature of 
the existing state sector and, as noted, changes in the shape of the state sector determine changes in 
the balance point of the provision structure. As Woodhead, Frost and James (2013) note, strong 
government regulation is essential in any public-private partnership arrangement meant to be 
comprehensive. Reforms in the state sector are also necessary in order to avoid ghettoization of 
public schools, as evidenced by Vasavi (2003) in India, and Gasparini et al. (2011) in Argentina. In 
both contexts the questions raised by Härmä (2013) still remain, regarding the impact of private 
education for vulnerable sectors in terms of equity. Schemes that oblige deprived families to divert 
part of their income in order to pay for their children’s basic education seem inconsistent within a 
sustainable development program. 
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